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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ESTHER B. KING,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
vs.

LA WREN CE M. KING,
Defendant and Appellant.

1·

12056

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

This Reply Brief is submitted to correct misstatements of the record contained in Respondent's Brief,
and to clarify the facts in issue.
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RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON ITS
STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

PAGE 1 HREE, 1 HIRD PARAGRAPH.
Here Respondent denies that the trial court awarded
her $250.00 per month alimony because she was disabled when the divorce was heard. Appellant contends
there is no other reason in the record for her receiving
such award, so the award of alimony was immediately
connected to her inability to work. The possibility that
the award was based simply on the marriage itself is
not sustained by the evidence, because it was Respondent's third marriage, she had no children by it, and due
to the property settlement she received, she left the
marriage much better off financially than she entered
it. Pinion v. Pinion, 92 U. 255, 262, 67 P2d 265, (Fair
property settlement for childless marriage, if wife capable of self-support, suffices to meet husband's obligation without alimony in addition).
1

1

PAGE THREE, BOTTOM PARAGRAPH,
AND PAGE FOUR. Respondent quotes a medical
report from Dr. Hess, (Def. Ex. 1). Dr. Hess did a
spinal fusion on her back on March 31, 1968. The court
should note that her quotes from the medical report start
with an incomplete sentence, and include other incomplete sentences. The first quote used by Respondent
indicates that as of the date of the medical report, June
17, 1969, just before the hearing on July 11, 1969, that
Dr. Hess stated,
2
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She was also given explicit instructions as to
how to lift and how to bend and to avoid heavy
lifting. She was told to try and get by with what
she had. She was explicitly told how to lift and
bend so that she would avoid injuring her spine
at a higher level. X-rays on that occasion showed
a solid fusion from L-5 to the sacrum.
In fact this quotation has nothing to do with Respondent's condition in 1969. These are instructions Dr. Hess
gave her in September, 1968, to guide her while she was
recovering from the fusion.
As to her condition in June 1969, Respondent quotes
Dr. Hess as stating,
" .... she was advised to be careful with heavy
lifting. She was to squat to lift all objects and
was told that if she persisted with heavy lifting
she might wear out the next disc above . . . . "
This quotation omits Dr. Hess' prior sentence which
states, "It was my impression that she had an excellent
post-operative result of an L5-Sl fusion and that there
was no need to take additional X-rays, especially where
she was trying to cut down on expenses and this also
was being handled as a welfare case." (Def. Ex. 1).
Further Respondent continues from Dr. Hess'
report, page four, paragraph 2 of her brief,
" .... If one were to rate her as to permanent
impairment, her permanent partial impairment
as loss of body function would be approximately
ten percent."
3
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Here, Respondent omits Dr. Hess' prior statement
which reads, "As you can see above, this patient, in
my opinion, made a good recovery from an L5-Sl degenerate disc. She is capable of doing everything but
the heaviest of lifting." (Emphasis added).
The total effect of the omissions is to lead the court
to find Respondent disabled beyond the true facts.

PAGE SIX, PARAGRAPH 1.

states,

Respondent

Appellant also testified that his new wife received $150.00 per month from her ex-husband
as support money ...
In fact, Appellant testified that his new wife was supposed to receive $150.00 per month from her ex-husband,
but she often did not get it. ( R-60, p. 37, L3-24).

PAGE SIX, PARAGRAPH 2. If Respondent

wants the court to take all income of Appellant into
consideration as a benefit to him, as stated in this paragraph, including child support received by his present
wife for her four children, it would only be fair to give
him credit for the total support of all six people in his
home, for which $485.00 per month ($335.00 when the
support money isn't received) , is not an excessive sum.
Appellant acknowledges that a first marriage is a first
obligation. His point is simply that single, or remarried,
he can barely get by. (R-60, p. 35, Ll7-27).
In Respondent's statement of facts and her Argument, Point II, she gives the impression that she is in
4
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very poor health and under a good deal of medical attention. This confuses past difficulties with her condition at the time of the hearing on Appellant's Motion
to modify the Decree on July 11, 1969. As of the date
of that hearing, by Respondent's own testimony, the
following points are clear: ( 1) she had not been sick
since the spinal fusion in March, 1968, and was receiving no medical treatment for her back. (R-60, p.48,
L9-16; p.50, Ll9-29; p.55, L2-7); (2) she required
no medical attention at all other than an annual physical
and occasional nerve pill, (R-60, p.53, L3-9; p.53, L29p.54, L4; p.66, L22-25); ( 3) she could bend, lift and
work, (Def. Ex. l; R-60, p.50, Ll9-29; p.55, L2-7;
p.57, L23-30; p.62, Ll8-p.63, L7); ( 4) her nervous
condition is not disabling, (R-60, p.65, L9-27).
Clearly as argument, but hopefully as logical argument, Appellant contends that Respondent cannot have
it both ways. That is, claim that she is disabled, but
also claim that she has looked for work and is willing
to work. If she doesn't think she is sound, why' did she
apply for work? The answer is in her only applying
for "several" jobs in the 16 months from the fusion
to the hearing. She doesn't want to look like a malingerer, so she says she is trying to find work, but she
is careful not to try so hard that she gets it. Her job
applications, in themselves, show that she knows that
she can work. If she couldn't and were truly disabled,
she could easily have had medical testimony to that
effect, and would ha Ye felt no need to build a record

5
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on her job efforts. The only conclusion, it is argued,
is that she herself knows that she is employable.
It is along this line of reasoning, that the error
of the trial court is clear. Its conclusions are based on
its Findings, ~2: " ... plaintiff is unable to bend or
stoop to do things; further her back condition has rendered her unable to secure employment or hold employment . . . " (R-62). In fact, Dr. Hess said she
could bend and lift, and she never testified that she
couldn't. How too could the court accurately find she
couldn't "secure employment," when she hadn't really
sought it, and how could the court accurately find she
couldn't "hold employment" when she never worked in
the 16 months between fusion and hearing?

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF.
POINT I. Respondent states,

ARGUMENT.

"Appellant's argument in Point I is based entirely on a misconception of the trial court's position in a prior proceeding. Here, apparently, the
Appellant is referring to a prior hearing in which
the parties attempted by stipulation to amend
the decree of divorce, but were unable to agree,
and subsequently were under the impression tha_t
the court was going to make an order based on a
stipulation that the parties never agreed to."
Respondent's position, apparently, is that the court
entered no written order, concerning Appellant's Petition for l\iodification, prior to its written decision signed
March 20, 1970, and that accordingly that decision is
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entitled to full weight. This contention is contrary to
the record.
Both Appellant's and Respondent's attorneys agreed
in open court (R-68-69), that the court did make a
verbal order in chambers at the conclusion of the evidence on the petition for modification on July I I,
1969. This verbal order was that the court would, (I)
reduce alimony $50.00 per month forthwith, and ( 2)
require Respondent to go to work, and then determine
what further reduction should be made as her earnings
proved out. The court did invite a stipulation of counsel, but this was that if the parties could agree on a
figure representing Respondent's future earnings, the
court would use that figure in making the further reduction of alimony contemplated in part 2 of the order.
'Vhen the parties could not agree on this figure, Respondent's own attorney drew the order as per the
court's verbal order, even though this reduced Respondent's alimony. The court sat on this order. It never
rejected nor affirmed it, nor asked counsel to reappear.
Finally, Appellant's counsel petitioned the court to sign
the order. ( R-54-56) . That petition was heard September 9, I969. (R-67, p.I-3). At that hearing the
court then offered to enter an order giving Appellant
$50.00 per month relief. This was refused as being
inadequate. The court then ordered that Appellant's
petition be denied altogether, and that Respondent's
counsel draw appropriate Findings and Order. This
was done. Then the court did not act until March 20,
1970, when it finally signed the written order. In all,
I
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over nine months elapsed between the hearing and the
signing. This is set forth in detail in Point I of Appellant's Brief. The point to be made here, is that while
the court only signed one order, it first made one verbal
order, and later offered a second verbal order, before
finally signing the third.
However, even if both counsel misunderstood the
court, whether the court made an order or suggested
a stipulation, either way, at the close of the evidence,
the court felt that Respondent could and should work,
and Appellant obtain relief. This is contrary diametrically to the court's final order.
While favoring the Findings of the trial court, still,
in an appeal concerning alimony, the Appellate Court
reviews the facts de novo. Pinion v. Pinion, supra; Hendrick v. Hendrick, 91 Utah 553, 558, 63 P2d 277;
Hampton v. Hampton, 86 Utah 570, 572, 47 P2d 419.
This rule has particular application when the trial court
has been inconsistent. Drury v. Lunsberg, 18 U2d 74,
77, 415 P2d 662.
Respectfully submitted,
SAMUEL KING
King, Craft & Bullen
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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